In the classic herding models of Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992), we see both:
Motivating Example: Texas highway drivers, with two states H and L. Some drivers are going to Houston and some to Dallas. Payoffs depend on the type (destination) and the state.
In state H, Houston types should take the high road and Dallas types should take the low road.
In state L, Houston types should take the low road and Dallas types should take the high road.
Suppose that 70% of drivers are Houston types and 30% are Dallas types. What sorts of cascades are possible?
1. A type-specific herd. Eventually, all Houston types take the high road and all Dallas types take the low road. (Absent a strong signal to the contrary, a Dallas driver should take the less crowded road and a Houston driver should take the more crowded road.) 2. A type-specific herd in which all Houston types take the low road and all Dallas types take the high road.
There are t ≥ 1 rational types and 2 "crazy" types. A fraction of the population, κ 1 always choose action 1, and a fraction of the population, κ 2 always choose action 2. The fraction of rational types is κ = 1 − κ 1 − κ 2 .
In equilibrium, agents know the strategies of the other agents, and can therefore compute the probability that the state is H after any history of choices of previous agents. We call this probability the public belief, denoted by q.
Given public belief q and private belief p, posterior belief is
Define the public likelihood ratio (of state L vs. state H) before agent n observes her signal as
Fact: The stochastic process < q n > is a martingale, so we have E(q n+1 |q n ) = q n . Because q n is bounded, it almost surely converges to a random variable. That is, the sequence converges to some limit point, but the limit point is random.
Also, given state H, < n > is a convergent martingale. To see this,
Therefore, we have
To finish the description of the game, we need payoffs. For m = 1, 2, the payoff of an agent of type t with posterior beliefs r from action m is
Here u s t (m) is a parameter of the game representing the payoff from action m when the state is known to be s.
Denote a type-t agent's preferred action in state H as a t 2 and her unpreferred action in state H as a t 1 .
Note: one interpretation of "crazy" types is that they have the same preferred action in both states.
Then in equilibrium agents use a threshold strategy that depends on the type and the public likelihood ratio. There is a threshold belief p t ( ) such that a t 2 is chosen if and only if p t ≥ p t ( ).
For some likelihood ratios, it is possible that all typet agents choose the same action, independent of their signal. This defines two cascade sets, with boundaries and .
For ≤ , all type-t agents choose action a t 2 , and for ≥ , all type-t agents choose action a t 1 .
If 0 < < < ∞ holds, then private beliefs are said to be bounded, and if = 0 and = ∞ holds, then private beliefs are said to be unbounded.
Some more notation:
ρ t (m|s, ) denotes the probability that a type-t agent chooses action m given state s and public likelihood ratio .
ψ(m|s, ) denotes the probability that an agent of unknown type chooses action m.
λ t denotes the proportion of rational agents who are type t. Thus, λ 1 + λ 2 = 1.
ϕ(m, ) denotes next period's public likelihood ratio when the current period's ratio is and the agent chooses action m.
Equilibrium Transitions
Example 1 One rational type, so λ 1 = 1
(Think of action 2 as "investing," which pays off in state H.)
From (3), an agent is indifferent between actions when posteriors are given by r = 1 1 + u .
From (1) and (2), the belief threshold is therefore
Example 1A: Unbounded beliefs with no crazy types.
Suppose agents receive private signals, σ ∈ (0, 1), with densities
Then we can calculate p = σ, so the density and distribution functions for private beliefs are given by
From (7) and the fact that p can be arbitrarily close to 0 and to 1, it is clear that we have unbounded beliefs.
Substitution into (4)-(6) yields
Given state H (w.l.o.g.), the likelihood ratio is a convergent martingale. Convergence requires either ϕ(1, ) = or ϕ(2, ) = , from which we conclude: ∞ = 0 with probability one. The probability of an infinite subsequence of action 1 is zero, so there is a herd on action 2, the correct choice in state H.
The situation is very different from discrete examples, like BHW, where there is a positive probability of a herd on the wrong choice.
An interesting feature of the equilibrium is that, when is close to zero and there has been a string of action 2 choices, there is always a positive probability that an agent gets a signal below p( ) = u+ . In that case, the agent will choose action 1 and beliefs change dramatically to + 2u.
Example 1B: Bounded beliefs with no crazy types.
Replace the previous signal densities with
Then we can calculate
The range of possible private beliefs, as σ ranges from 0 to 1, are: 2 5 < p < 2 3 .
Since p( ) = u+ , the range of likelihood ratios is given by = 2u 3 and = 2u.
Dynamics
If u ≥ 3 2 , we have 0 ≤ 2u 3 , and we herd on action 2 from the beginning.
If u ≤ 1 2 , we have 0 ≥ 2u, and we herd on action 1 from the beginning.
For the interesting case, 2u 3 < 0 < 2u, equations (4)-(6) imply
Given state H, the likelihood ratio converges, which requires either ϕ(1, ) = or ϕ(2, ) = .
Now there are two possibilities, ∞ = 2u, in which case we herd on action 1, or ∞ = 2u 3 , in which case we herd on action 2.
Since we have a martingale, E( ∞ |H) = 0 , so we can compute the probability of an action 2 herd, π, solving
Note: for 2u 3 < 0 < 2u, beliefs never enter the cascade set, even though a herd starts with probability one. There is always a (vanishing) probability that an agent will go against the herd. If so, beliefs change drastically.
Example 1C: Bounded beliefs with "crazy" types.
Introducing crazy types to the previous example will affect the dynamics, but not the cascade sets.
We have = 2u 3 and = 2u.
But here, unlike the previous example, when is near 2u 3 or 2u, beliefs are continuous in actions. That is, ϕ(1, 2u 3 ) = and ϕ(2, 2u) = .
Extremely unlikely actions are attributed to noise. w.l.o.g., assume v ≥ u.
Thresholds for the two types are:
p U ( ) = u + and p V ( ) = v + .
For p > p U ( ), type U chooses action 2.
For p > p V ( ), type V chooses action 1.
Assume the same bounded belief structure as in Example 1B:
F L (p) = (5p − 2)(p + 2) 8p 2 , and suppose that 2u > 2v 3 and 0 ∈ ( 2v 3 , 2u).
